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STANDARD OF CARE FOR STUDENTS WITH 
DISABILITIES: THE INTERSECTION OF LIABILITY 
UNDER THE IDEA AND TORT THEORIES 
Ralph D. Mawdsley, J.D., Ph.D. * 
INTRODUCTION 
The responsibility of public schools to provide related 
services and appropriate placements for students with 
disabilities intersects with schools' obligation to protect 
students from harm. 1 Students with disabilities receiving 
special education services under the Individuals with 
Disabilities in Education Act (IDEA)2 differ from the remainder 
of the public school population because the manner in which 
school officials interact with them is determined to a large 
extent by services and placement decisions reflected in a 
student's Individualized Education Program (IEP).3 Because 
the IEP can provide considerable details regarding a disabled 
student's needs and behaviors, the question becomes how that 
knowledge should affect a school's standard of care for those 
students. Indeed, do schools have a heightened standard of care 
to assure the safety of fragile students as well as protecting 
students in general from those with behavior disorders? The 
answers are not simple. The interface between the IDEA and 
tort liability standard of care has never been clear and courts 
have been somewhat cautious about using the language of an 
*Ralph D. Mawdsley, J.D., Ph.D. is Professor and the Roslyn Z. Wolf Endowed Chair in 
Urban Educational Leadership at Cleveland State University, Cleveland, Ohio. 
1. This article represents an update of two earlier articles by the same author: 
Ralph D. Mawdsley, Supervisory Standard of Care for Students With Disabilities, 80 
ED. LAW REP. 779 (1993); Ralph D. Mawdsley, Standard of Care and Students with 
Disabilities, 148 ED. LAW REP. 553 (2001). This article appears in 252 Education Law 
Reporter 527 (2010). 
2. 20 U.S. C. § 1400 et seq. 
3. For statutory obligations regarding the IEP, see 20 U.S.C. §§ 1414, 1415(d), 
(f). 
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IEP as the basis for a standard of care, if for no other reason 
than that a heightened standard of care being set for disabled 
students may not be the same for the majority of students who 
have no IEPs. Thus, in a large sense, does the heightened 
investment in resources and personnel attention required for 
students with disabilities under the IDEA also translate into a 
heightened standard of care if those students with disabilities 
are injured or cause injury to others? 
This article explores issues of legal liability for school 
personnel where students with disabilities are injured in school 
settings or cause injuries to employees and other students in 
schools. While questions related to legal liability are varied, 
they tend to fall within two broad areas: standard of care 
relating to injuries to or by students; and, standard of care for 
employees working with students with or training others to 
work with students with disabilities. In both areas, the legal 
issue revolves around the concept of heightened standard of 
care, especially where framed by the language of students' 
IEPs. To what extent should injuries to, or caused by, students 
with disabilities be considered within the context of a 
heightened standard of care where an IEP reveals a student's 
propensity to cause injuries or to be vulnerable to injuries? 
Where services provided to students with severe disabilities as 
part of their IEPs have life-saving components to them (such as 
suctioning tracheotomy tubes4 or ambubag venting5), should 
the responsibility for providing those services or for training or 
supervising others to provide the services be assessed by a 
heightened standard of care?6 
4. Clearing a tracheotomy tube is a routine procedure that occurs after an 
operation where a tube has been inserted in the throat to permit breathing. 
Indications that the tube needs to be suctioned in order to clean out mucous can 
include rattling mucus not cleared with coughing, fast rattling, bubbles of mucus at 
tracheotomy opening, fast, noisy, hard breathing, and dry, whistling sound. 
UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI ACADEMIC HEALTH CENTER, DEPARTMENT OF 
OTOLARYNGOLOGY, TRACHEOTOMY CARE HANDBOOK, 
www.med.uc.edu/ent/documents/Tracheotomy Handbook. pdf (last visited 617/09). 
5. An ambu bag "is a compressible, self-inflating, non-rebreathing silicon bag, 
which has an inlet through which air and additional 0 2 is supplied and an outlet 
through this can be transferred to the patient." Pediatric Oneall, 
www.pediatriconcall.com/fordoctor/medical_equipment/ambu_bag.asp (last visited 
6/16/09). 
6. See Irving Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Tatro, 468 U.S. 883 (1984) (holding that school 
nurse's administration of clean intermittent catheterization (CIC) was not a medical 
service under IDEA, without reaching the question whether providing CIC constituted 
the practice of nursing, thus raising civil and criminal issues about the unauthorized 
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To facilitate an understanding of the issues relevant to 
students with disabilities and tort liability, this article will be 
divided into four parts: Part I discusses the U.S. Supreme 
Court's decision in Cedar Rapids Community School District v. 
Garret F. 7 and how satisfying the IDEA's Least Restrictive 
Environment (LRE)8 requirement has been instrumental in 
shaping concern among educators about their own tort liability 
when students, especially students with disabilities, are 
injured; Part II presents case law that has framed tort liability 
standards under state common law and constitutional tort 
theories involving students with disabilities; Part III analyzes 
cases that have applied standards of care to specific 
educational settings involving injuries both to students with 
disabilities and injuries caused by such students; and, Part IV 
summarizes the status of the law and furnishes some 
guidelines for educational policy in protecting students with 
disabilities within the context of the requirements of the IDEA. 
I. GARRET F., THE IDEA AND THE LIMITATION ON THE 
EXCLUSION OF STUDENTS WITH DISABILITIES FROM REGULAR 
EDUCATION 
A. Garret F.: The Responsibility to Educate and the Medical 
Services Exemption 
The IDEA assures that "[t]o the maximum extent 
appropriate, children with disabilities ... are educated with 
children who are not disabled."9 The effect of this LRE 
requirement is that most students with disabilities will be 
included in regular classrooms and will be excluded only when 
practice of nursing). See Tatro v. State of Texas, 703 F.2d 823, 828 (5th Cir. 1983). 
7. 526 U.S. 66 (1999) (holding that continuous nursing services for quadriplegic 
student was a related service and not a medical service and student could not be 
excluded from regular classroom attendance solely because of the cost associated with 
providing that service). 
8. 20 U.S.C. § (a)(5)(A) defines LRE as follows: 
To the maximum extent appropriate, children with disabilities, including children 
in public or private institutions or other care facilities, are educated with children 
who are not disabled, and special classes, separate schooling, or other removal of 
children with disabilities from the regular educational environment occurs only 
when the nature or severity of the disability of a child is such that education in 
regular classes with the use of supplementary aids and services cannot be 
achieved satisfactorily. 
9. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A) (2006). 
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those school personnel responsible for designing a disabled 
student's IEP can furnish persuasive evidence that "the nature 
or severity of [a student's] disability is such that education in 
regular classes with the use of supplementary aids and services 
cannot be achieved satisfactorily." 10 
The IDEA requires that students eligible for special 
education receive related services that will allow them to 
receive "some educational benefit" 11 in the least restrictive 
environment. 12 The only exception is that school districts are 
not required to provide "medical services." 13 However, the U.S. 
Supreme Court in Garret F. 14 held that school personnel were 
required to provide a one-on-one nurse as a related service to a 
medically fragile student and that such a service did not fall 
within the IDEA's medical service exemption. 15 As a result of 
Garret F., students with even severe disabilities cannot be 
excluded from public schools and regular classrooms within 
those schools solely based on the nature and expense of related 
services. Garret F. has prompted an awareness by school 
personnel of an increased level of responsibility for the safety of 
these fragile students. 16 In addition, the inclusion of students 
10. 34 C.F.R. § 300.114 (a)(2)(ii). 34 C.F.R. § 300.116(a)(l) and (2) provide that 
"[t]he placement decision-- (1) Is made by a group of persons, including the parents, 
and other persons knowledgeable about the child, the meaning of the evaluation data, 
and the placement options; and (2) Is made in conformity with the LRE provisions." 
11. Board of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Central School Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 
176, 200 (1982). 
12. 20 U.S. C. § 1401(26)(A) (2006). 
13. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(26)(A) (2006). However, related services include medical 
services that are for "diagnostic and evaluation purposes only." ld. 
14. 526 U.S. 66 (1999) (holding that continuous nursing services for quadriplegic 
student was a related service and not a medical service and student could not be 
excluded from regular classroom attendance solely because of the cost associated with 
providing that service). 
15. Garret F. resolved a conflict between federal circuits as to whether providing 
nonintermittent, full-time nursing services was a "medical service" under IDEA. See 20 
U.S. C. § 1401(26)(A) (limiting "medical services" to "diagnostic and evaluation purposes 
only"). Compare Granite Sch. Dist. v. Shannon M., 787 F. Supp. 1020 (D. Utah 1992) 
(nonintermittent nursing services to suction tracheotomy tube and feed student 
through nasograstic tube was a medical service, in part because the $30,000 cost for a 
nurse for one student was excessive, given the limited nursing services available to 
nondisabled students) with Dep't of Educ. of Hawaii v. Katherine D., 531 F. Supp. 517 
(D. Haw. 1982) , aff'd, 727 F.2d 809 (9th Cir. 1988) (providing a person to suction a 
tracheotomy tube not a medical service under IDEA, in part because lay persons could 
be trained to provide the service). 
16. See e.g., Rossetti v. Bd. of Educ. of Schalmont Cent. High Sch., 716 N.Y.S.2d 
460 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000) (A post-Garret F. case raising liability of teacher's aide in 
diapering seven years old spastic quadriplegic student who was unable to walk or 
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with emotional disabilities in regular education programs has 
made school officials potentially responsible for harm to other 
persons both within 17 and outside school settings. 18 
I. The IDEA's Commitment to Providing Special Education 
Services to Students in the Least Restrictive Environment 
(LRE): Requirements and Limitations 
Because the IDEA assures that "[t]o the maximum extent 
appropriate, children with disabilities . . . are educated with 
children who are not disabled," 19 school districts bear the 
burden of not only including even severely disabled students in 
the regular classroom, but of assuring that such can be 
accomplished without unreasonable risk to those students or to 
other nondisabled students in the schools. However, in order 
for students to be eligible for services under the IDEA they 
must meet age standards,2° have a condition listed in the 
statute, 21 and by reason of the condition, need "special 
education and related services."22 To a large extent, school 
officials' concern about tort liability resulting from injuries to 
special education students, as opposed to those students 
without disabilities, reflects the responsibilities imposed on 
school districts under the IDEA. One fundamental difference is 
that a school's responsibilities for students with disabilities are 
speak and who spent the majority of his waking hours confined to a wheelchair). 
17. See J.N. ex rei. Hager v. Bellingham Sch. Dist. No. 501, 871 P.2d 1106 (Wash. 
Ct. App. 1994) (reversing trial court's grant of summary judgment to school district as 
to sexual assaults by fourth grade student diagnosed as severely behaviorally disabled 
against first grade student during school recess). 
18. See Thomas v. City Lights, Inc., 124 F.Supp.2d 707 (D.D.C. 2000) (in refusing 
to dismiss complaint against an alternative school for assault on plaintiff by five of its 
students while on a field trip to a zoo, a federal district court indicated that defendant 
could be liable under a Restatement of Torts standard whereby "[o]ne who takes charge 
of a third person whom he knows or should know to be likely to cause bodily harm to 
others if not controlled is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to control the third 
person to prevent him from doing such harm." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TOHTS § 319 
(1965)). 
19. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A)(2006). 
20. The age range is three through twenty-one, 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(l)(B), 
although children within the age range are no longer covered once they have received a 
regular high school diploma. 34 C.F.R. § 300.102(a)(3)(i). 
21. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A)(i) "mental retardation, hearing impairments (including 
deafness), speech or language impairments, visual impairments (including blindness), 
serious emotional disturbance (referred to as "emotional disturbance"), orthopedic 
impairments, autism, traumatic brain injury, other health impairments, or specific 
learning disabilities." 
22. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A)(ii)(2006). 
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set forth in an IEP, a contractual document with a designation 
of a disability or disabilities, long-term and short-term goals, 
and specified services that is negotiated, and reviewed at least 
annually, by parents and school personnel.23 The identification 
of both a disability and the services necessary to permit a 
student to receive educational benefit makes a student with an 
IEP unique in the sense that those working with that student 
are aware of risks that the disabled student may pose to other 
students or of risks that may be faced by the disabled student 
where his or her services are inadequately or incorrectly 
provided. A second difference is that a student with an IEP 
that specifies special education nursing services may be 
receiving a related service24 not readily available on a regular 
basis to students without disabilities.25 For example, even if 
full-time nurses are not be available on a regular basis to 
provide IEP nursing services as required in a student's IEP, for 
reasons such as cost or a shortage of nurses in the area, those 
services, nonetheless, will still have to be provided even if by 
school nurse-trained non-nursing personnel.26 As a result, the 
23. 20 U.S.C. § 1414 sets forth the timeline for preparing an IEP, the content 
areas within the IEP, the constituency of the IEP team that drafts the IEP, and the 
process for review and change of the IEP. See generally, MARK WEBER, RALPH 
MAWDSLEY, & SARAH REDFIELD, SPECIAL EDUCATION LAW AND MATERIALS: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 209·241 (LEXIS NEXIS 2007) for a comprehensive discussion of the IDEA's 
requirements concerning development and implementation of the IEP. 
24. "Related services" are given an expansive definition in IDEA federal 
regulations: 
Related services means transportation and such developmental, corrective, and 
other supportive services as are required to assist a child with a disability to 
benefit from special education, and includes speech·language pathology and 
audiology services, interpreting services, psychological services, physical and 
occupational therapy, recreation, including therapeutic recreation, early 
identification and assessment of disabilities in children, counseling services, 
including rehabilitation counseling, orientation and mobility services, and medical 
services for diagnostic or evaluation purposes. Related services also include school 
health services and school nurse services, social work services in schools, and 
parent counseling and training. 
34 C.F.R. § 300.34(a). 
25. See Vida Svarcas, The Role and Utilization of Nurses in Ohio's Schools 
(Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Cleveland State University,) (indicating in Ohio the 
high student· nurse ratio, the lack of nurse presence in most public schools on a regular, 
daily basis, and the pattern of public school assignment of nurses to functions other 
than nursing). See also, Garret F), 526 U.S. 66 (1999) (holding that the exclusion of 
"medical services" as a related service under the IDEA did not apply to nursing 
services); 34 C.F.R. § 300.34(c)(5) (medical services "means services provided by a 
licensed physician to determine a child's medically related disability that results in the 
child's need for special education and related services"). 
26. See Garret F., 526 U.S. at 77 ("[20 U.S.C.] § 1401(a)(17) does not employ cost 
in its definition of 'related services' or excluded 'medical services,'[ and] accepting the 
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question for school districts is the extent to which the provision 
of intensive and potentially lifesaving related services (such as 
nursing services), whether by nurses or nurse-trained public 
school non-nursing employees, serves to heighten their duty of 
care to the students with disabilities receiving those services. A 
third difference is that parents under the IDEA have a 
mandated, integral role in the process of formulating an IEP 
that permits them to challenge the school's program or 
placement for that IEP27 by demanding an adversarial "due 
process hearing"28 and they or the school district may appeal 
an adverse decision of the hearing officer to court, which may 
hear additional evidence in order to decide the case.29 The 
extent to which parents should share in responsibility for their 
children's safety if they fail to furnish information that would 
be important in determining the level of services in a student's 
IEP has little judicial record but, arguably, parents who have 
provided incorrect information, or who have refused to consent 
to services that the school considers important for the student's 
health or safety should share some measure of responsibility.30 
While "the IDEA imposes an obligation on the School District 
to identify and evaluate children with disabilities,"31 parents 
may not be able to impose additional financial cost on a school 
district where they have failed to request IEP changes at an 
IEP meeting. 32 
[School] District's cost-based standard as the sole test for determining the scope of the 
provision would require us to engage in judicial lawmaking without any guidance from 
Congress"). 
27. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1414(d) (2006). 
28. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (2006) (setting forth a broad range of parents' procedural 
rights to challenge decisions regarding evaluation, related services, and placement, as 
well as entitlements to impartiality, participation in the hearing and a variety of 
remedies). 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1415(f)-(i) provides that states may create a hearing review 
procedure that must be exhausted before the matter goes to court(§ 1415(g)) but while 
the due process hearing progresses the child will remain in the existing placement 
during the pendency of proceedings. § 1415(j). 
29. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A) (2006). 
30. See Clay City Consolidated Sch. Corp. v. Timberman, 896 N.E.2d 1229 (Ind. 
Ct. App. 2008) (while not a special education case, a state appeals court held that a 
jury was entitled to be instructed as to a contributory negligence defense against 
parents suing a coach and a school district for negligence and wrongful death in the 
death of their son during a basketball practice where the parents had failed to provide 
medical information about the nature of their son's medical condition). 
31. Seattle Sch. Dist., No. 1 v. B.S., 82 F.3d 1493, 1497 (9th Cir. 1996) (emphasis 
added). 
32. See Schoenbach v. District of Columbia, 309 F.Supp.2d 71, 87 (D.D.C. 2004) 
(in rejecting parents' request for reimbursement for unilateral placement of their child 
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II. TORT LIABILITY CASE LAW AND STANDARD OF CARE UNDER 
STATE COMMON LAW AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 
A. Legal Theories for Recovery of Damages: Requirements and 
Limitations 
School districts owe to their students a standard of care, at 
the mm1mum, determined under ordinary common law 
negligence, but in many states, state legislatures have lowered 
that standard under their governmental immunity statutes so 
that school personnel can be liable only where there is gross 
negligence or reckless or willful conduct.33 However, whatever 
the standard of care, the legal analysis as to the burden of 
proof begins in the same place by examining whether a 
recognized duty was owed, whether a breach of that duty has 
occurred, whether the breach was the proximate cause of an 
injury, and whether that injury is one cognizable in the state. 
School districts have a duty to employ competent and proficient 
personnel, to adequately instruct and supervise students and 
employees, to provide safe facilities and equipment, and to 
make and enforce adequate rules. However, a determination as 
to whether a school district owes a duty to a student and 
whether that duty has been breached requires viewing the 
injury to a person through the filters of foreseeability and the 
reasonable person. The reasonable person takes on an injured 
student's age, education, and experience, as well as the 
student's familiarity with an activity and the difficulty or 
dangerousness of the activity. The task for the trier of fact is to 
determine whether the injury to the student with those 
characteristics was foreseeable. 34 As students mature 
in a private school, a federal district court criticized, in colorful language, the parents 
for their failure to make their requests known: "Critical to the finding that Anna's 
parents' actions contributed to the inappropriateness of the Initial IEP is the dog that 
did not bark at the March 26, 2002 IEP meeting"). 
33. For a statutory definition of "willful and wanton misconduct," see 745 ILCS 
10/l-210 where willful and wanton misconduct is defined as "a course of action which 
shows an actual or deliberate intention to cause harm or which, if not intentional, 
shows an utter indifference to or conscious disregard for the safety of others or their 
property." For a comprehensive discussion of the differences between ordinary and 
gross negligence/willful conduct, see Charles Russo and Ralph Mawdsley, EDUCATION 
LAW§ 6.04[1], Immunity (New York: Law Journal Press 2009) discussing the impact of 
state governmental immunity on standard of care. 
34. See e.g., Hammond v. Bd. of Educ. of Carroll County, 639 A.2d 22:3 [90 Ed. 
Law Rep. [256] (Md. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that school district had no duty to warn 
1 
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physically and mentally and demonstrate improved skills and 
competency in dealing with situations posing greater risks of 
injury, these filters of reasonable person and foreseeability can 
be used by courts to adjust the standard of care owed by school 
districts to students. 35 For some students receiving special 
education services, though, the rate of change will not be the 
same as for typical students and, thus, the question becomes 
the extent to which a student's disability, diminished rate of 
change in skills, and diminished competencies will affect a 
school district's standard of care in providing adequate and 
appropriate personnel, rules, supervision, instruction, and safe 
premises and equipment. 36 
While students with disabilities have a variety of legal 
remedies to correct inadequate or inappropriate treatment, 
including the nondiscrimination statutes section 50437 and the 
Americans with Disabilities Act [ADA],38 this article focuses 
female student competing on football team and who suffered serious and permanent 
internal injuries of possible serious injury where participation was voluntary; while 
notice to parents that such injuries could result from playing football might be a good 
practice, the district had no duty to do so). 
35. The classic case is Cox v. Barnes, 469 S.W.2d 61 (Ky. 1971) (finding a school 
district not liable for drowning death of a high school senior on a field trip where the 
student had attempted to swim to a diving tank 40 yards from shore with a clearly 
marked sign, "Off Limits," and where the court determined in part that a eighteen-
year-old was old enough to read and obey signs). See also Rixmann v. Somerset Pub. 
Sch., 266 N.W.2d :326, 333 (Wis. 1978) (holding that two students characterized by the 
court as "not the brightest" could not maintain their lawsuit against the school district 
for injuries incurred during a chemistry lab fire where their conduct did not "conform 
to that which would be expected of a similarly situated child of the same age and with 
the same capacity, discretion, knowledge and experience in creating the initial fire"); 
Aaris v. Las Virgenes Unified Sch. Dist., 75 Cal. Rptr.2d 801 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) 
(finding no negligence where student injured during practice of routine cheerleading 
gymnastic routine had been adequately instructed and the coach had not increased the 
level of difficulty from the routines that plaintiff had received instruction for and the 
routines being practiced). 
36. See Hammond, supra note 33, at 226 (suggesting, without reaching a 
conclusion, that a duty to warn and supervise would have been different had plaintiff 
been "mentally deficient"). 
:n. 29 U.S.C. § 794. Sec. 794, better known as § 504, is a vehicle for private 
damages claims and provides that: 
No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States ... shall, 
solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be 
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or 
activity receiving Federal financial assistance .... 
38. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12132. The ADA overlaps § 504 but also extends 
nondiscrimination on the basis of disability to private sector organizations with slightly 
different variation on the nature of the protected class: 
[N]o qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be 
excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, 
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primarily on state law tort claims framed in negligence, gross 
negligence, or willful and wanton conduct. Constitutional tort 
claims under section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act39 remain a 
popular legal theory and are discussed briefly in order to 
highlight the differences in standard of proof between the state 
law negligence/gross negligence/willful conduct theories and 
constitutional theories. 
B. Tort Claims under a State Common Law Standard of Care 
Whether state claims are viable will depend in the first 
analysis on state governmental immunity statutes. Generally, 
these statutes exclude governmental entities, including school 
districts, from liability. However, these statutes permit liability 
if the conduct of governmental entities falls within certain 
categories specified within the statutes. These categories vary 
among states, but governmental entities may be liable for 
employee conduct where the conduct was willful and wanton40 
or where the conduct is considered to be ministerial (as opposed 
to discretionary) in nature.41 In many states, though, even if a 
or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination hy any such entity. 
For a discussion of the difference in the interpretation of §§ 504 and ADA, see Baird v. 
Rose, 192 F.3d 462 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding that the Title VII employment standard 
permitting causation to be proved where disability discrimination was a motivating 
factor in discriminatory conduct applied to ADA but not to § 504 which permitted a 
claim only when discriminatory conduct was the sole basis for such discrimination). 
Both § 504 and ADA are viable only to the extent that the facts involve discrimination. 
See Allen v. Susquehanna Township Sch. Dist., 233 Fed. Appx. 149 (3d Cir. 2007) 
(upholding dismissal of parents' § 504 and ADA claims that the death of a student with 
an emotional disability who ran away from school and was killed in traffic allegedly 
resulted from the failure of school to appoint an escort failed to state a discrimination 
claim where no one had requested or prescribed an escort for him in his IEP). 
39. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Sec. 1983 creates no rights of its own, but is solely a vehicle 
to recover damages for violations of constitutional and federal statutory rights: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom. or 
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to 
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the 
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities 
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an 
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ... 
40. See Summers v. Slivinski, 749 N.E.2d 854 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001) (remanding 
for trial as to whether cheerleader advisor's statements to an injured cheerleader 
concerning her performance of a specific routine constituted willful and wanton conduct 
that would fall within an exemption from the state's governmental immunity statute). 
41. See Babb v. Hamilton County Bd. Of Educ., No. E2004-00782-COA-R3-CV, 
2004 WL 2094538 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that a school principal had exercised 
a discretionary function in readmitting a student with a disability who had struck a 
teacher and was suspended, and then had struck the teacher again after being 
readmitted, where the principal had to balance the risk of further injury to those in the 
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government employer is liable, the amount of damages 
recoverable from the employer can be limited by statute to a 
certain maximum amount.42 Injured claimants must fit within 
one of these statutory exceptions to governmental immunity in 
order to recover damages. 
In Stiff u. Eastern Illinois Area of Special Education,43 
parents of an epileptic student injured while on a field trip 
sued the special education organization and the teachers under 
both negligence and willful and wanton misconduct counts for 
lack of adequate supervision. When seven years old, the 
student plaintiff along with seven other students with 
disabilities were taken on a hike in a state park accompanied 
by five professionals.44 While attempting to cross a bridge by 
first passing under a tree limb that had fallen over the bridge, 
the student's leg buckled causing her to lose her balance and 
fall off the bridge, fracturing her femur. The state court of 
appeals upheld dismissal with prejudice of the student's 
negligence claim under the state's governmental immunity 
statute that permitted immunity where public school teachers 
had acted in loco parentis toward students. In this case, the 
court reasoned that the student's teachers, by conferring and 
discussing several possibilities of getting the student across the 
bridge before deciding that she would be able to maneuver 
under the fallen tree with a teacher a short distance in front of 
her, demonstrated the same kind of discretion and decision-
making process that would be used by parents. The student 
also had sought liability within the state's governmental 
immunity statute by attempting to prove willful and wanton 
conduct by the teachers but the appeals court affirmed the trial 
school against the student's stay put and manifestation hearing rights under the 
IDEA). 
42. See Larson v. lndep. Sch. Dist. No. 314, 289 N.W.2d 112 (Minn. 1979) 
(regarding payment of paraplegic student's judgment in excess of $1,000,000 against 
school district, PE teacher and school principal, school district responsible for only 
$50,000 under governmental immunity statute setting school district minimum 
liability at $50,000 where, in this case, the school district had provided only for that 
minimum amount of liability insurance coverage). See also Tindley v. Salt Lake City 
Sch. Dist., 116 P.3d 295 [200 Ed. Law Rep. [406] (Utah 2005) (upholding statutory 
$500,000 limit for damages related to one occurrence as reasonably related to a 
legitimate pedagogical concern). 
43. 666 N.E.2d :i4:~ [110 Ed. Law Rep. [1167] (Ill. App. Ct. 1996). 
44. These professionals were the plaintiffs classroom teacher. adaptive physical 
education teacher, crisis interventionist, two teacher's assistants, and a student 
teacher. !d. at 344. 
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court's directed verdict for the teachers because they had 
displayed neither "an utter indifference toward or conscious 
disregard for [the student's] safety,"45 the kind of conduct that 
would be required if the student were to establish willful and 
wanton conduct. 
Worth noting in Stiff is that while the teachers prevailed in 
the negligence claim, they did so only because they were able to 
persuade the court that their conduct with respect to the 
student with disabilities represented the same level of care 
that the parents of that child would have displayed. Thus, the 
discussion that occurred among the teachers prior to 
attempting the crossing of the bridge as to the nature of the 
child's disability and her risk of injury was crucial to a finding 
of statutory immunity. Perhaps, if the teachers had attempted 
to cross the bridge without this discussion the court might have 
found that the teachers were not excluded from a negligence 
claim under the in loco parentis provision in the state's 
governmental immunity statute. 
More recently, another Illinois appeals court, in Mitchell v. 
Special Joint Agreement School District No. 208,46 determined 
that parents of an injured student with disabilities had failed 
to produce evidence of willful and wanton conduct in their 
damages claim against a school district. In Mitchell, a Down's 
Syndrome student who was profoundly mentally delayed, not 
able to speak, severely hearing impaired and requiring 
assistance with all of his daily functions, including meals, had 
close one-on-one supervision so as to prevent his eating too 
quickly and putting too much food in his mouth. The social age 
of the student in this case was 12 months, his academic age 11 
months and his physical size 34 months. The school and staff 
were familiar with the plaintiff's specific needs related to food 
where he would stuff food too rapidly into his mouth requiring 
the intervention of his one-on-one aide to stop him from eating 
more food until he had chewed and swallowed the food in his 
mouth. While the student had never choked on food in the past 
prior to the incident in this case, the student had on several 
past occasions grabbed food from nearby trays or from other 
students and stuffed the food into his mouth, often swallowing 
it without chewing first. On the day during which the student's 
45. Stiff, 666 N.E.2d at 346. 
46. 887 N.K2d 352 [238 Ed. Law Rep. [8:36] (Ill. i\pp. Ct. 2008). 
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injury occurred, the aide had served a cupcake to each student 
in the room, carefully cutting up the plaintiffs into small bites 
and, after distributing a cupcake to other students, one 
cupcake was left on a tray on the table. Mter eating his 
cupcake, the student was served cereal and, believing that the 
other students had finished their cupcakes and that the risk of 
the student's taking food from other students had passed, the 
classroom teacher sat at his desk completing an attendance 
form, leaving the supervision of the student to the aide. When 
the student spilled milk from his cereal on the table, the aide 
backed up several feet to grab a paper towel from a sink in the 
room to clean up the milk, but kept eye contact with the 
student at all times. However, while the aide was wetting a 
paper towel at the sink, the student grabbed the remaining 
cupcake, stuffed it into his mouth and disregarded the aide's 
order to stop. The student began to gag and choke and, despite 
the aide's response within seconds and administration of the 
Heimlich maneuver, the student had to be transported to a 
hospital where he remained in an induced coma for an 
indeterminate amount of time. After he awakened, he had 
some difficulty walking and incurred $80,000 in medical 
expenses that were paid by public aid. The student's willful and 
wanton damages claim was premised on the theory that 
because the school was aware of his issues with food, taking 
even a few steps away from him at lunch demonstrated "a 
conscious disregard for his safety."47 Relying on Stiff, the 
Mitchell appeals court affirmed the grant of summary 
judgment to defendants, observing that the "school staff [had] 
maintained close supervision over [the student], evincing 
concern for his safety."48 
However, worth noting is how the Mitchell court parsed the 
facts to find the absence of willful and wanton conduct. The 
court found three facts controlling: 
Both the student's teacher and aide believed that the other 
students had finished their cupcakes and that the student 
would not be motivated to take food from others when he had 
his own cereal to finish; 
Although the classroom teacher was seated at his desk, he 
had done so believing that the risk of the student's compulsive 
47. Id. at 356. 
4H. Id. at :i57. 
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behavior had passed once the plaintiff and other students had 
eaten their cupcakes and student was eating his cereal; and, 
Being aware of the student's issues, the aide continued to 
maintain eye contact with student as she stepped back a few 
feet to the sink without turning her back on him.49 
The fact that does not come into play in this appeals court's 
analysis is how leaving the cupcake on the tray within easy 
reach of the student might have influenced the result in a 
different set of facts. To what extent would plaintiff's claim for 
willful conduct have withstood the school district's motion for 
summary judgment if the sink had been located farther across 
the room from the plaintiff or the aide had turned her back on 
the plaintiff when she walked to the sink? 
On its face, Mitchell does not seem to have altered the test 
for determining willful misconduct, in the sense that the 
responsibility for school personnel to provide supervision of 
students is commensurate with their knowledge of student 
behavior. However, the nature of the supervision for a student 
with disabilities, such as the one in Mitchell, would seem to 
differ qualitatively from whatever supervision would be 
expected for a student without disabilities. The recording of the 
Mitchell student's behaviors in his IEP manifested a risk that 
was continuous, persistent and life threatening and, thus, 
mandated a duty to supervise commensurate with that risk. 
Notably missing in Mitchell was a written behavior 
intervention plan (BIP)50 as part of his IEP, but for tort 
liability purposes that deficiency appears to have been 
compensated for by all of the school personnel's "aware[ ness] of 
[plaintiff's] specific needs related to food" 51 and their "common 
sense" approach to monitoring the plaintiff during meals. 52 
Thus, Mitchell reveals an anomaly that, while failure to comply 
with a requirement of the IDEA (designing a BIP) can 
constitute a violation of a free appropriate public education 
49. Id. 
50. A BIP is "a written document that outlines how the IEP team and others will 
try to intervene with environment and/or the student to alter problematic behaviors 
presented by a student and identified in the functional behavioral assessment." Mark 
Weber, Ralph Mawdsley and Sarah Redfield, SPECIAL EDUCATION LAW: CASES ANU 
MATERIALS G-3 (Newark NJ: LEXIS NEXIS 2007). See 20 U.S.C. § 14 Hi(k)(l)(D),(F): 34 
C.F.R. § 300.503(£). 
51. Mitchell, 897 N.E.2d at 354 
52. Id. at 355. 
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(FAPE) under the IDEA, 53 it will not result in tort liability as 
long as the elements of standard of care have been addressed in 
some other manner. 
C. Section 1983 Constitutional Tort Theory 
An injured student also can pursue damages under a 
constitutional tort theory, essentially a claim that the injury 
resulted from school conduct depriving a student of a 
Fourteenth Amendment54 right to life or liberty without due 
process of law. Constitutional tort liability is premised not on 
whether a school district has breached a common law duty of 
care, but whether a student injury was caused by a violation of 
a constitutional right under one or more of three theories -
whether a school board had a special relationship with the 
injured student at the time of injury, 55 whether the injury was 
state-created,56 or whether the board had a policy, custom, or 
practice of violating the rights of the student. 57 However, 
constitutional tort bears a kinship to common law tort liability 
in that courts must determine under either legal claim whether 
a breach of legal expectation (common law or constitutional) 
caused an injury.58 
In Sargi v. Kent City Board of Education, 59 a special 
5.'3. See Nt-osho R-V Sch. Dist. v. Clark, 315 F.3d 1022 (8th Cir. 2003) (failure of 
IEP to have BIP attached had denied student FAPE where, even though the student 
was making progress in meeting goals, his lack of a BIP with strategies and techniques 
to address his behavioral problems kept him out of the regular classroom). 
54. U.S. CONST., amend. XIV, § 1 ("[No] State [can] deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process oflaw"). 
55. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 198 
(1989) (finding that student with disabilities being transported on school bus lacked 
special relationship). 
56. See D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical Sch., 70 F.3d 1364, 1373-
74 (3d Cir. 1992) (school not liable under state created theory where it had not limited 
plaintiffs freedom to act or barred her access to outside help). 
57. See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388-89 (1989) (city can be liable for 
inadequate training of personnel only where such a lack was a custom and practice 
that demonstrated deliberate indifference). 
58. See Wyke v. Polk County Sch. Ed., 129 F.3d 560 (11th Cir. 1997) (reversing 
federal district court's denial of summary judgment as to plaintiffs' § 1983 claim that 
school had a constitutional duty to notify them that their son, who had emotional and 
behavioral problems, had twice attempted suicide at school, rejecting plaintiffs' claim 
that the school's failure to notify them had "affirmatively prevented" them from saving 
their child's life. and asserting that compulsory school attendance laws alone are not a 
"restraint of personal liberty" sufficient to give rise to an affirmative duty of 
protection). 
58. 70 F.3d 807 (6th Cir. 1995). 
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education student who suffered from a seizure disorder and 
Q.T. Syndrome, a heart condition, collapsed from heart failure 
while being taken home on one of the buses owned by the 
Board of Education. When the student collapsed, the bus driver 
attempted to contact his supervisor on a C.B. channel but was 
unable to do so because the equipment was faulty. However, 
believing that that the student was having only a seizure the 
school bus driver thought that medical attention was 
unnecessary and continued to take the other children who were 
on the bus to their homes. At one of the stops, a neighbor 
approached with a portable phone, at which time the bus driver 
contacted the bus garage and told the secretary to contact the 
student's mother. By the time the bus reached the student's 
home, the student was not breathing and he fell into a coma 
and died three days later. 
The mother brought claims under a constitutional tort 
theory that the school board, its Transportation Coordinator, 
and its Business Manager, all of whom allegedly knew of the 
student's disabling condition had failed to maintain adequate 
policies, rules, and regulations, and had failed to train its 
employees in CPR and emergency procedures. In addition, the 
mother asserted state law wrongful death and pain and 
suffering claims against the Board on a theory of respondeat 
superior based on the alleged negligence of its employees. 60 
The district court, in an unpublished opinion, found that, as 
a matter of law under § 1983, the defendants did not have a 
constitutional duty to protect the student, that defendants did 
not affirmatively place decedent at risk of harm, and that the 
student's death did not result from a constitutional violation. 
As to the state law claims, the district court found that Ohio 
law immunized the school board from liability on the mother's 
state law claims. The mother appealed the district court's order 
granting defendants' motion for summary judgment on all of 
her claims to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. 
The Sixth Circuit in Sargi, in upholding the district court's 
summary judgment, found that the mother had failed to 
produce evidence of causation that the death of the student had 
60. The Sixth Circuit upheld summary judgment for the school district on the 
state tort claims because state statutes did not impose a private cause of action where 
a school bus lacked certain equipment nor did plaintiffs prove that the conduct of the 
bus driver or the school district rose to the level of "wanton and reckless" conduct. Id. 
at 913. 
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resulted from a special relationship, the school board's custom 
or practice of not adequately training its bus drivers, or a state-
created danger. Citing federal appeals court decisions 
representing other jurisdictions,61 the Sixth Circuit observed 
that compulsory attendance would not, in itself, create a 
special relationship requiring the school district to act in a 
manner to protect a student with a disability. Even if the State 
of Ohio had created a duty of care under state law to protect 
students, the Sixth Circuit noted that "not all state created 
duties of care create a constitutional duty of care and 
protection."62 As to the student's medical condition and the 
school district's knowledge of that condition, the Sixth Circuit 
found no special relationship between the [student] and the 
school because "a special relationship can only arise when the 
state restrains an individual. Decedent's medical condition and 
its debilitating effects, however, were not restrictions imposed 
or created by the state."63 
As to the mother's claim that the school board had adopted 
and maintained a practice, policy, or custom of reckless 
indifference to instances of children having seizures on school 
buses, and that the policy had directly caused the 
constitutional deprivation of the student's life, the Sixth Circuit 
held that "there [was] no evidence that the Board affirmatively 
adopted a custom, practice, or policy of taking children 
suffering from seizures home without medical intervention."64 
Nor had the mother presented evidence that the school board 
had adopted a custom, practice, or policy of preventing school 
bus drivers from obtaining medical assistance for children 
suffering from seizures or that the board's alleged failure to 
train its employees rose to the level of deliberate indifference.65 
Deliberate indifference requires more "than a failure to 
recognize [a] high risk of harm."66 
Finally, the Sixth Circuit rejected the plaintiff's claims that 
the school district had created the danger that resulted in the 
student's death by: 
61. See id. at 911, citing to cases from other federal circuits. 
62. !d. 
63. !d. 
64. !d. at 912. 
65. !d. 
66. !d., citing to Black v. Indiana Area Sch. Dist., 985 F.2d 707, 712-13 (3d Cir. 
1993). 
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(1) failing to provide bus drivers with a plan or policy 
concerning the management of emergencies on its buses; (2) 
instituting a policy of taking seizure victims home without 
any emergency medical intervention; (3) failing to maintain 
properly working communications devices on the bus; and (4) 
failing to communicate decedent's medical condition to her 
school bus driver. 67 
In essence, the court of appeals found "no evidence that the 
Board [had taken] any affirmative action that exposed decedent 
to any danger to which she was not already exposed."M; 
Satisfying the federal courts' burden of proof requirements 
is equally daunting for all student plaintiffs whether or not 
they have disabilities.69 A finding of negligence under state tort 
law would not satisfy the section 1983 deliberate indifference 
standard, but it is far from clear that even gross negligence 
would meet that standard in the absence of establishing one or 
more of the three causation factors discussed in Sargi. Just as 
every constitutional violation does not constitute a common law 
tort, not every injury inflicted by a government official in 
violation of the common law rises to a constitutional violation70 
for the simple reason that "[o]rdinary tort law aims at the 
private distribution of loss [while] [c]onstitutional tort law ... 
involves the public distribution of rights and obligations."71 
Thus, although constitutional torts remain a popular theory for 
litigation by students with, or without, disabilities, "the public 
distribution of rights and obligations" does not become quite as 
vital for students with disabilities where they also possess 
significant statutory rights under the IDEA, § 504, and ADA. 72 
67. Id. 
68. Id. at 913. 
69. See Parker v. Fayette County Pub. Schs., No. 08-5244, 2009 WL 1443706 (6th 
Cir. 2009) (the Sixth Circuit followed its earlier Sargi decision and found no Liberty 
Clause violation of a right to bodily integrity where an autistic student, who had run 
away from school and was later found covered with mud and without his clothes. was 
determined not to have suffered an injury compensable under section 1983 where 
"there [was] no evidence of any trauma or injury, physical or otherwise."). 
70. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 544 (1981). 
71. Gary S. Gildin, Allocating Damages Caused by Violation of the Charter: The 
Relevance of American Constitutional Remedies Jurisprudence, 24 NAT'L J. CONST. L. 
121, 134 (2009). 
72. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 443 (1985). 
With reference to § 504 and IDEA, the Supreme Court, in assigning only a rational 
purpose test to mental impairment under the Equal Protection Clause, reasoned that 
the distinctive legislative response, both national and state, to the plight of those 
who are mentally retarded demonstrates not only that they have unique problems, 
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III. PROTECTING BOTH STUDENTS WITH DISABILITIES AND 
REGULAR STUDENTS FROM HARM 
A. Protecting Students with Disabilities 
One of the effects of inclusion under the IDEA IS that 
among special education students brought into regular 
education settings are those whose disabilities cause them to 
be more susceptible to injury. To what standard of care should 
school personnel be held in protecting such students and what 
should be the measure of liability where IDEA services are 
provided in an inappropriate manner? 
In Brooks v. St. Tammany Parish School Board,73 a 
mentally impaired student, with an I.Q. of 56, a mental age of 6 
years and a motor skill development of a child of 4 years, 2 
months,74 had been knocked down by two other junior high 
students engaged in horseplay near a concession stand on 
school property, resulting in 25% permanent disability to 
plaintiff Brooks' left leg. The school had permitted its special 
education students to eat lunch with regular students and to 
walk on the school grounds when finished. On the day that the 
student was injured, four teachers were on duty near the place 
where the injury occurred.75 
but also that the lawmakers have been addressing their difficulties in a manner 
that belies a continuing antipathy or prejudice and a corresponding need for more 
intrusive oversight by the judiciary ... The Federal Government has not only 
outlawed discrimination against the mentally retarded in federally funded 
programs [§ 504] .. . [but] has conditioned federal education funds on a State's 
assurance that retarded children will enjoy an education that, 'to the maximum 
extent appropriate,' is integrated with that of nonmentally retarded children 
[IDEA]"). 
For an example of a statutory protection under § 504 and ADA not available to 
nondisabled students, see Dennin v. Conn. Interscholastic Athletic Con(., Inc., 94 F.3d 
96 [111 Ed. Law Rep. [1154] (2d Cir. 1996) (although dismissing§ 504 as moot, Second 
Circuit recognized that a nineteen-year-old Down Syndrome student who had a 
provision for athletic participation in his IEP but who had reached his 19th birthday 
prior to his senior year, and, thus was ineligible under state athletic association rules 
to participate in interscholastic sports, had been entitled to the preliminary injunction 
issued by a federal district court under § 504 and ADA permitting him to participate 
on the swimming team, the district court reasoning that the association had 
discriminated against the disabled student by not waiving the rule for him.). 
73. 510 So.2d 51 (La. Ct. App. 1987). 
74. Id. at 53, 54. 
75. The ratio of teachers to students on the day of the injury is not stated, but the 
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The basis for the parents' claim against the junior high 
school under an ordinary negligence theory was that it should 
have provided a one-on-one aide, even though the student's IEP 
had not required one. The trial court found the school district 
liable because an unreasonable risk of harm had been created 
by permitting a student with poor balance to travel alone near 
a concession stand where horseplay among regular education 
students was common. 76 
Reversing a $60,000 judgment for the student, a state 
appeals court, in finding that the school had not been 
negligent, identified two factors that were controlling in its 
decision. First, the student's IEP had not required a one-on-one 
aide, nor had the parents requested one in the IEP conferences. 
Second, given the IDEA's emphasis on mainstreaming, the 
student did not fit into a category of students who required 
total segregation, that is, those who were "severely impaired 
and who [had] limited or no motor skills and no language 
ability."77 In other words, the school district was not going to be 
held to a standard of care to provide a service that the parents 
had said was unnecessary. 
However, the nature of the disability and the nature of the 
school activity can alter liability. In Greider u. Shawnee 
Mission Unified School/8 an IEP provided that a student with 
a behavioral disability be enrolled in a woodworking class. 
While in the class, the student was injured using a table saw. 
The student's parents sued the school district, alleging among 
other counts that the school had "place[d] him in the class 
despite his behavioral disturbance" and had "fail[ed] to 
properly notify [the woodworking teacher] of his enrollment in 
the class and his particular needs."79 The school district's 
defense was that it was entitled to qualified immunity under 
the state's Tort Claims Act80 on the grounds that its 
supervision of student safety and reasonable protection of 
students was a discretionary function. In denying the district's 
motion for summary judgment, the court not only held that 
schools and teachers had a duty of supervision and instruction 
ratio varied from 5:120 to 10:600. !d. 
76. !d. at 51. 
77. !d. at 54. 
78. 710 F. Supp. 296 (D. Kan. 1989). 
79. !d. at 297. 
80. KAN. STAT. A."!N. § 75-6104. 
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to students in general, but more specifically they owed a special 
duty to students with disabilities.1q The court observed that the 
school had a duty under the IDEA to notify the teacher of the 
student's needs and problems82 and the teacher had a duty to 
instruct the student in operating power tools, "despite his 
behavioral disorder."83 
A similar result was reached in Guidry v. Rapides School 
Board 84 where parents of a mentally impaired female student 
sued a school district for negligence after their daughter had 
been sexually assaulted by a mentally impaired male student. 
The assault had occurred in a common area to which the 
students had access after their morning break and which was 
visually accessible from an adjoining teacher's lounge, except 
for a small part hidden by a partition. The supervisory teacher, 
who had gone to the teacher's lounge for a smoke break, upon 
noticing the absence of two boys promptly returned to the 
common area to find one of the boys kneeling over the girl. 
Although the parents could not prove sexual intercourse, the 
girl nonetheless had suffered considerable psychological harm. 
In upholding a $16,000 damages award for the parents, the 
court observed that "schools offering training for mentally, 
emotionally, or socially handicapped young people have a duty 
to use reasonable care to protect their students from harm."85 
Moreover, this reasonable care encompassed "the risk of 
sexual behavior by students whose bodies have developed 
beyond their mental ability to understand or control their 
urges."86 In Guidry, the teacher's knowledge that the students 
required "constant supervision" determined the standard of 
care and, thus, failure to provide that level of supervision 
constituted a breach of duty. 87 
School districts are obligated under the IDEA to provide 
whatever services are necessary for a student to achieve a 
meaningful educational benefit. What is the measure of 
81. Greider. 710 F.Supp. at 299. 
82. ::!4 C.F.R. § :100.328(d)(2). Each LEA must ensure that "Each teacher ... is 
informed of- (i) His or her specific responsibilities, related to implementing the child's 
IEP; and (ii) The specific accommodations, modifications, and supports that must be 
provided for the child in accordance with the IEP." 
83. Greider, 710 F. Supp. at 297. 
84. 560 So.2d 125 [GO Ed. Law Rep. [262] (La. Ct. App. 1990). 
85. Id. at 127. 
86. Id. at 128. 
87. !d. 
380 B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW .JOURNAL [2010 
liability where a student InJury occurs from either 
inappropriate design for services or ineffective implementation 
of that design? 
In Greening v. School District of Millard ,88 a state-licensed 
physical therapist (PT) and occupational therapist (OT) 
employed by the State of Nebraska Services for Crippled 
Children designed a series of exercises for the plaintiff student 
who had been born with a congenital deformity 
(myelodysplasia) that left him unable to ambulate, eventually 
resulting in osteoporosis, and a weakening of the bones in his 
legs. Neither the PT nor OT had time to work with the student 
so the school district where the student attended elementary 
school hired an aide to assist the student with the exercises. 
During one session, when the student complained of a popping 
sound, the aide failed to respond and continued the exercises. 
Later that day, X-rays showed that the student had a leg 
fracture. The state supreme court upheld lower court decisions 
finding no liability for the school district because the district 
could not be vicariously liable for an exercise program designed 
by persons who were not their employees. 89 As to school 
district's responsibility for its aide, who was not licensed as 
either a PT or OT, in assisting the plaintiff to perform the 
exercises the supreme court noted that, 
[t]o impose liability on an employer for negligently entrusting 
work to an employee incompetent to perform such work, a 
plaintiff must not only show that the employer negligently 
selected a person incapable of performing the work but also 
show that the conduct of the incompetent employee was a 
proximate cause of injury to another. 90 
Since the physicians who testified at trial indicated that the 
aide had neither incorrectly or incompetently supervised or 
conducted the exercise regimen nor caused the student's injury, 
negligence could not be predicated on the aide's lack of training 
in PT. In the absence of evidence that the aide "knew the 
88. 393 N.W.2d 51 [34 Ed. Law Rep. [1199] (Neb. 1986). 
89. ld. at 59. 
The district was entitled to rely upon the competence of a professional therapist, 
licensed, paid, and supplied by the state. To hold otherwise would require a school 
district to independently verify the safety of a program developed by a professional 
who is entrusted by the state with the responsibility of carrying out such program. 
Under the facts of this case, we decline to impose such duty on the school district. 
90. Id. at 58. 
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potential medical danger associated with the exercises,"91 the 
supreme court refused to impute the aide's lack of knowledge to 
the school district. However, the court cautioned that, 
[A person may] be engaged in an activity, or stand in a 
relation to others, which imposes upon him an obligation to 
investigate and find out, so that the person becomes liable not 
so much for being ignorant as for remaining ignorant; and 
this obligation may require a person to know at least enough 
to conduct an intelligent inquiry as to what he does not 
know. 92 
The school district escaped negligence vicarious liability 
because the supreme court was not willing to "conclude that 
the orders or directions given by any therapist to [the aide] 
were so obviously improper, thereby requiring [the aide] to 
disregard and refuse to carry out those directions, or, at least, 
make further inquiry regarding correctness of any order or 
direction given."93 
What is patently clear from Greening is that liability can be 
premised on both the design and implementation of special 
education services. The task of an IEP team is to design an IEP 
for each student with disabilities who qualifies for special 
education, identifying services that each student is to receive. 94 
The expectation is that each IEP team will include personnel 
familiar with the services specified in the IEP95 and, in any 
case, either the school district or parents can include "other 
individuals who have knowledge or special expertise regarding 
the child, including related services personnel as 
appropriate."96 What is clear from the IDEA and accompanying 
litigation is that liability can be based on failure to have 
knowledgeable personnel on the IEP team, as well as failure to 
have appropriately trained persons implementing the IEP. 
91. ld. at 59. 
92. ld. quoting from PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, Negligence: 
Standard of Conduct § 32 at 185 (5th ed. 1984). 
93. ld. 
94. See 20 U.S.C. § 1436(d) for the list of requirements for an IEP. 
95. For the minimum individuals required for an IEP team see 20 U.S.C. § 1414 
(d)(l)(B)(i)-(vii). 
96. 20 U.S. C. § 1414 (d)(1)(B)(vi). 
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B. Protection of Persons from Injury by Students with 
Disabilities 
[2010 
Students with disabilities, particularly those with 
emotional disorders, can represent a risk of injury to other 
students, as well as school personnel. To what standard should 
school districts be held in protecting other persons in the school 
from injury inflicted by special education students with 
emotional disorder disabilities? 
Where injuries have been occasioned by special education 
students, some courts have made an effort to connect the 
nature of the disability to the common law tort liability 
standard of care. In Collins u. School Board of Broward 
County, 97 a state appeals court upheld a jury verdict for a 
student in a shop class who had been sexually assaulted by an 
emotionally handicapped student. Since the assaultive student 
was in the shop class by virtue of his IEP, the court found that 
the duty of a teacher to supervise students is greater where 
regular and emotionally handicapped students are included in 
the same classroom. In response to the school district's claim 
that it should not be liable for the intentional sexual 
misconduct of a student, the court noted that the assault by 
this student was foreseeable, given the student's past history of 
sexually aggressive conduct, including exposing himself and 
fondling other students.98 
Students with emotional and behavioral disabilities can 
present risk of injury to employees as well as students. In 
Brady u. Board of Education of City of New York, 99 a teacher 
was injured when she intervened to prevent an assault by one 
student of another. She sued the school district, on the theory 
that the district knew of the assaultive student's violent 
propensities and had failed to remove him from the school. A 
state appeals court upheld summary judgment for the district 
under governmental immunity, because a decision whether to 
permit a student to stay in school was discretionary in nature. 
As the court observed, "pupil placement is a matter of 
97. 471 So.2d 560 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985). 
98. Even though school officials had twice suspended the student for his 
behaviors, this discipline, rather than demonstrating that the school had addressed the 
behaviors, indicated that officials were aware of the behaviors and should, therefore, he 
responsible for a higher level of supervision in the classroom. !d. at 564. 
99. 602 N.Y.S.2d 892 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993). 
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educational policy, the responsibility for which lies within the 
professional judgment and discretion of those charged with the 
administration of the public schools." 100 However, the court 
suggested that the district would lose its immunity if it owed a 
special duty to teachers to protect them from assaults. 
Although not specified by the court, this special duty could 
probably be created by a variety of means-a state statute, 
language in a collective bargaining agreement, or oral promises 
from administrators. The court in Brady (in the absence of a 
special duty) had not needed to address the issue of standard of 
care. The IDEA requires that behavioral interventions be 
included in a student's IEP where the child's misbehavior is 
impeding learning, 101 but leaves open the question whether a 
school district can be liable under a reasonable person standard 
of care for failing to include appropriate measures to address a 
special education student's misbehavior. 
In Collins, discussed above, the assault by a student with a 
past pattern of aggressive behavior had occurred during a ten-
minute span of time when a substitute teacher was absent from 
the classroom. Although the case is silent regarding the 
substitute teacher's knowledge about the assaultive student, 
the court was clear that the presence of the emotionally 
disabled student presented a different risk that had not been 
addressed. Combining Greider and Collins, a school's duty to 
inform classroom teachers about the problems and needs of 
emotionally/behaviorally disabled students can affect the 
standard of care. 
However, a tort standard of care may not be relevant if a 
state has created a different, higher standard. In 
Vallandigham v. Clover Park School District, 102 a teacher and 
paraprofessional, who had received, over the period of two 
school years, 140-150 injuries (teacher) and 40-50 injuries 
(paraprofessional) 103 from a 12-year-old autistic child with a 
100. !d. at tl93. 
101. For example, see :14 C.F.R. § 300.324(a)(2) where an IEP team must consider 
"positive behavioral interventions, strategies, and supports" and include them in the 
IEP if a child's misbehavior is impeding learning. For students with a disciplinary 
change of placement or who have been removed for more than 10 days, a BIP must be 
initiated with 10 school days, preceded by a functional behavioral assessment. For 
students with a BIP, it must be reviewed by the IEP team within 10 school days of the 
change in placement and modifications made as necessary. 
102. 109 P.3d 805, 806 [197 Ed. Law Rep. [397] (Wash. 2005). 
103. Vallandigham v. Clover Park Sch. Dist. No. 400, 79 P.3d 18, 22 (Wash. Ct. 
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behavior disorder, sought recovery for damages under the 
Industrial Insurance Act's deliberate intention to mJury 
exception to the exclusive provision of the Act. 104 Even though 
the court found that the student's IEP reported repeated 
aggressive episodes sufficient to create actual knowledge by the 
school district that the student's conduct would produce injury, 
the school district was not liable because it had not willfully 
disregarded its knowledge of the certain injury. In upholding 
summary judgment for the school district, a Washington court 
of appeals held that the following responses by the school 
district demonstrated that the district had not willfully 
disregarded injuries imposed upon plaintiffs and other staff 
members: 
1. contacted [the student's] doctor about the change in 
medication; 
2. performed a functional behavior analysis to determine the 
cause of [the student's] behavior; 
3. continued documenting [the student's] behavior; 
4. called an IEP meeting to discuss [the student]; 
5. assigned a temporary aide to work directly with [the 
student]; 
6. hired a permanent one-on-one aide to work directly with 
[the student]; 
7. created a separate area outside the classroom for use as an 
isolation or time-out space; 
8. offered restraint training and issued walkie-talkies to 
selected staff; 
9. sent staff to observe [the student] at the Frances Haddon 
Morgan Center, where he had been placed for observation and 
App. 2003) (seven other employees also received injuries during the two years ranging 
from one to fifteen in number). 
104. Wash. Rev. Code§ 51,24.020. This statute creates an exception to no employer 
liability for job-related injuries where conduct causing an employee's injury satisfies 
the standard of "deliberate intention: 
If injury results to a worker from the deliberate intention of his or her employer to 
produce such injury, the worker or beneficiary of the worker shall have the 
privilege to take under this title and also have cause of action against the 
employer as if this title had not been enacted for any damages in excess of 
compensation and benefits paid or payable under this title. 
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assessment, to discuss placement, intervention, and 
behavioral issues; 
10. placed [the student] in a half-day program; 
11. staff from the Center visited the District to discuss [the 
student] and his placement; 
12. considered alternative placements for [the student], but 
declined these alternatives because they were inappropriate 
or unwilling to take [the student]. 105 
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A school's duty to protect can extend to members of the 
public. In Thomas v. City Lights, 106 the plaintiff, a member of 
the public, was assaulted at the National Zoological Park (the 
zoo) at Washington D.C. by five students with behavioral 
disorders. All five students were enrolled in City Lights, a 
private, nonprofit school organized under District of Columbia 
law for at-risk students, and were on a school field trip at the 
zoo when the attack occurred. In denying the school's motion 
for summary judgment, a District of Columbia federal district 
court held that school owed a duty to supervise its students to 
prevent foreseeable harm from occurring to members of the 
public while on a field trip. The district court predicated 
possible liability under § 316 of the second edition of the 
Restatement of Torts that, "One who takes charge of a third 
person whom he knows or should know to be likely to cause 
bodily harm to others if not controlled is under a duty to 
exercise reasonable care to control the third person to prevent 
him from doing such harm." 107 Applying this provision, the 
court reasoned that the school could be liable if it "(1) took 
charge of the five students within the meaning of § 316, (2) if 
the five students were likely to cause bodily harm to others if 
not controlled, and (3) if City Lights knew or should have 
known of the students' propensity to cause bodily harm."108 
Although Thomas discusses neither the IDEA nor IEPs, 
City Lights was operated for "at risk children ages twelve to 
twenty-two years of age." 109 To the extent that some or all of 
lOfi. Vallandigham, 109 P.:3d at 24. 
106. 124 F.Supp.2d 707 (D.D.C. 2000). 
107. American Law Institute, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 819 (1965). 
108. Thomas, 124 F.Supp.2d at 712. 
109. ld. See 20 U.S.C.A. § 1412(a)(1)(B).where the upper range of responsibility for 
students under the IDEA is a student's 22d birthday. 
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the students at City Lights had been placed there pursuant to 
the IDEA, Thomas indicates that a school's duty under tort 
liability can exist apart from its responsibility under the IDEA. 
The troublesome aspect of Thomas, to distinguish it from other 
cases involving injuries to employees or other students, is that 
members of the public are unlikely to have any knowledge of 
the risks posed by the behaviors of some students with 
disabilities and, thus, the Restatement of Torts' effort to shift 
responsibility to those in the school who have such knowledge, 
arguably, seems appropriate. 
School districts have the responsibilities both to implement 
the IDEA and to protect students, school employees, and 
members of the public. In terms of school employees and 
students, one approach might be applying a reasonable person 
test to school officials' responses to complaints about disabled 
students' conduct. The reasonableness could be twofold: 
reasonableness in reconvening an IEP team to address such 
complaints; and reasonableness in providing services to 
address the objectionable conduct, which could include using 
the due process hearing route to require services, even if not 
desired by parents. 
IEPs, arguably, are effective only so far as school personnel 
who work with emotionally/behaviorally disabled students are 
aware of their provisions. To the extent that an IEP should be 
important (if not determinative) in defining standard of care, 
how should a school district's responsibility to communicate 
information to school personnel affect that standard of care? 
The IDEA follows the Family Educational Rights and Privacy 
Act (FERPA) 110 in providing access to "education records" 
without parental consent to those persons with "legitimate 
educational interests," 111 a right of access that normally would 
include all school personnel working with a student with a 
behavioral disability. However, the FERPA does not permit 
providing information about a person's disability to members of 
the public. 
Determining the appropriate standard of care for 
emotionally/behaviorally disabled students is difficult because 
there is not an easy fit with other areas of tort liability. The 
perception by regular education students, parents of such 
110. 20 U.S.C. § 1232f; 34 C.F.R. §§ 99.3-99.67. 
111. 34 C.F.R. § 99.31(a)(l). 
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students, and teachers that emotionally/behaviorally disabled 
students are dangerous may result in demands to remove these 
students from the classrooms. 112 In cases involving students in 
general, if a student/parent/teacher complaint involved 
dangerous power equipment, the standard of care would be 
commensurate with the risk represented, including heightened 
requirements for instruction and supervision, or possibly, 
making the equipment inaccessible to students. 113 Would the 
same characterization work for emotionally/behaviorally 
disabled students? Would treating such students as if they 
were a dangerous power saw fly in the face of the IDEA's 
purpose to dignify special education students by "ensur[ing] 
that all children with disabilities have available to them a free 
appropriate public education that emphasizes related services 
designed to meet their unique needs and prepare them for 
employment and independent living"? 114 Courts face a 
challenge in addressing an appropriate tort liability standard 
for students with disabilities (and especially those with 
emotional/behavioral disabilities) in that a standard of care, if 
it is to honor the requirements of the IDEA, must be 
established that does not demean, degrade, and prejudge these 
special education students by placing them in the same 
categories as dangerous objects, activities, or places. 115 
112. See e.g., Ross v. Maumee City Schs., 658 N.E.2d 800, 803 (Ohio Ct. App. 
1995) where a violent student's removal from a multi-handicapped unit followed a 
meeting with parents of other students in the unit and a threatened lawsuit by parents 
of an injured child. 
11 :~. See e.g., Fontenot v. State Dep't of Educ., 635 So.2d 627 (La. Ct. App. 1994) 
(special education student who severely lacerated his hand while adjusting the guide 
fence on a power saw when the blade was turning lost in negligence suit where 
instructor had been in classroom during injury, where student had not been required to 
have individual supervision, and where the instructor's instructions about adjusting 
tlw blade had been adequate). 
114. :14 C.F.R. § :100.l(a). 
115. The inherent danger argument is prevalent in products liability where it is 
used to present a claim for strict liability without the need to produce evidence of 
negligence or willful conduct. See e.g., Fallon u. Indian Trail Sch., 500 N.E.2d 101 [35 
Ed. Law Rep. [1205] (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (rejecting claim that trampoline was 
intrinsically dangerous so as to create strict liability for injuries that occurred while 
using it and rejecting claim of negligent hiring as to whether PE teacher was qualified, 
the appeals court observing that liability for negligent hiring arises only when 
particular unfitness of applicant creates danger of harm to third person which 
employer knew, or should have known, when he hired and placed applicant in 
employment where he could injure others). 
388 B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL [2010 
IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The contractual nature of an IEP creates difficulties in 
defining the standard of care for school districts that may face 
litigation under a tort liability claim for injury to, or at the 
hands of, special education students. 116 Should districts be 
limited in their standard of care to what they have committed 
to do under an IEP? Clearly, a district's responsibility for the 
safety of regular education students is defined, at the least, by 
the ordinary standard of care under negligence, and possibly a 
heightened standard for the higher risk level of dangerous 
objects, activities, or places. Regular education students, 
however, do not negotiate IEPs under the IDEA with school 
districts. 
The choice as to how to resolve liability issues resulting 
from the interaction of the IDEA and tort liability is not an 
easy one. Although school officials may want to remove an 
aggressive student from a regular educational setting, they are 
constrained by the LRE requirements of the IDEA. To subject 
those officials to the risk of tort liability, after they have 
selected a less restrictive environment and another student is 
injured, would arguably serve to undercut the purpose of the 
IDEA's LRE requirement. One approach would be that the 
standard of care for school districts should be measured solely 
by the timeliness and appropriateness of their actions under 
the IDEA in reconvening an IEP team, assessing a student's 
IEP, and designing behavioral modifications. Increasing the 
standard for tort liability for placement decisions would likely 
result in increased use of due process hearings by school 
districts in the hope that administrative or court decisions 
upholding placement decisions would block tort claims where, 
at the heart of an injured party's claim, is a question regarding 
the reasonableness of a placement decision that brought a 
student with behavioral disabilities in contact with other 
students. 
Special education students are unique in that they have 
services and review processes available to them that regular 
education students do not. To limit school district liability for 
116. See Graham v. West Babylon Union Free Sch. Dist., 692 N.Y.S.2d 460 [136 Ed. 
Law Rep. [1012] (N.Y. App. Div. 1999) (student assaulted by another student was 
entitled to unseal the assaulting student's disciplinary file to discover any past 
instances of violent and assaultive behavior). 
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the injury to, or an injury caused by, special education students 
resulting from compliance with an IEP creates, one could 
argue, the appearance of two different standards for measuring 
student safety. In essence, school districts could be shielded 
from tort liability as long as they comply with the IDEA, while 
no such shield would exist for claims that do not involve 
students with disabilities. Perhaps, the best that can be said is 
that, because of the public policy significance of addressing the 
needs of special education students under the current 
affirmative obligation statute (IDEA), our society may have to 
live with a certain measure of legal inconsistency. 
The lack of clarity as to how the requirements of the IDEA 
affect tort liability under state or constitutional tort theories 
should prompt school officials to take several preemptive steps. 
First, school districts need to communicate to all public 
education personnel who work with special education students 
that the provision of services in a student's IEP can be the 
basis for liability claims, not only for reimbursement and 
compensatory damages under the IDEA, 117 but also for 
damages under a state or constitutional tort liability theory. 
Second, school districts need to check their district liability 
policies to assure that their personnel who work with students 
with disabilities are covered for student-related injuries, even 
those involving gross negligence or willful conduct. Third, 
employees need to be advised that they should consider 
personal insurance protection, such as that provided by 
professional organizations, where they may be individually 
liable for injuries related to students with disabilities. Fourth, 
although not addressed in law cases discussed in this article, 
school officials may want to consider whether volunteers and 
chaperones who often accompany students on school trips 
should receive some measure of instruction concerning 
students with special needs. Very little litigation involves 
questions regarding the adequacy of supervision of volunteers 
or chaperones, 118 but the best interest of students in general 
117. See Forest Grove School District v. T.A., 129 S.Ct. 2484 (2009) (upholding 
reimbursement of tuition cost for unilateral parent placement where school district had 
failed to provide FAPE). See also, Mary T. v. School District of Philadelphia, 575 F.3d 
2:35, (3d Cir. 2009) (relying on Ji'orest Grove to find no claim for reimbursement or 
compensatory damages as a result of parent private school placement). 
118. See Robinson v. Jefferson Parish Sch. Bd., 9 So.3d 1035 (La. Ct. App. 2009) 
(in a case not involving a special education student, the court found no negligence 
where student's death on a field trip was not caused by school district's lack of a policy 
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(and special education students in particular) would seem 
served by providing those volunteers and chaperones with 
sufficient information to protect the students on field trips from 
foreseeable risks. 119 
on training chaperones). 
119. See generally, Jeffrey L. Brudney, The Effective Use of Volunteers: Best 
Practices for the Public Sector, 62-AUT LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 219 (1999) (discussing 
at some length the extensive use that public schools make of volunteers in tutoring, 
working in school programs, and in field trips). 
